Biblical Answer

Introduction

The debate between compatibilism and libertarianism in the doctrine of free will has been a longstanding issue in philosophy. Compatibilists argue that freedom is compatible with determinism, while libertarians argue that freedom is incompatible with determinism. Molinism, a theological perspective, offers a unique perspective on this debate. In this response, we will explore the implications of Molinism on the debate between compatibilism and libertarianism.

Molinism and Compatibilism

Molinism, as presented by Thomas Flint, posits that God's sovereignty is not in conflict with human free will. According to Molinism, God's providence is not limited to predetermining every event, but rather, God's sovereignty is exercised through His middle knowledge, which allows Him to know all possible outcomes of human decisions. This perspective suggests that human freedom is compatible with God's sovereignty, aligning with the compatibilist view. Molinism's emphasis on God's sovereignty and human freedom provides a framework for understanding how human choices can be both free and determined.

Implications for Libertarianism

The Molinist perspective challenges the libertarian view that freedom requires absolute origination of choices. By positing that God's sovereignty is exercised through His middle knowledge, Molinism suggests that human choices are not entirely uncaused. This challenges the libertarian notion that human decisions are not caused by anything outside of themselves. Furthermore, Molinism's emphasis on God's sovereignty implies that human freedom is not autonomous, but rather, it is exercised within the context of God's providential plan. This perspective undermines the libertarian argument that freedom requires absolute origination of choices, leading to a reevaluation of the incompatibilist position. In conclusion, Molinism offers a unique perspective on the debate between compatibilism and libertarianism, suggesting that human freedom is compatible with God's sovereignty, aligning with the compatibilist view. This perspective challenges the libertarian notion of absolute origination of choices, leading to a reevaluation of the incompatibilist position.